“Soft power” first emerged against the backdrop of the sharp confrontation between the West and the Soviet Union. Joseph Nye’s concept was originally directed against the USSR—against Russia. Shortly after the idea was put forward, the Soviet Union collapsed.
Of course, it was not Nye’s theory alone that brought down the “Evil Empire,” though it may have played its part. What has become clear now, however, is that Russian President Vladimir Putin spent vast sums in a bid to resurrect the old “Union” and pursue his dream of a “new USSR.” More precisely, intelligence officers appointed as “curators” over the former Soviet republics—now independent states—embezzled funds allocated from Russia’s budget, squandering them not just on their operations but on vodka. When Putin realized this, he shut down the entire system: the Directorate for Interregional and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries. According to information passed to Russia’s own outlet The Insider, Putin’s emissaries from the intelligence services deceived him.
One example is Valery Chernyshev, an officer of the GRU (Russia’s Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff). Confidential documents leaked to The Insider state that he served as “curator” for Azerbaijan. Looking at the list of curators for Armenia, Georgia, Moldova, and the Central Asian states, all turn out to be officers of military intelligence, the Foreign Intelligence Service, or the Federal Security Service. Imagine: the task of establishing and directing “soft power” in Azerbaijan was handed to a military intelligence officer. In other words, the building of “cultural relations” with post-Soviet countries was entrusted to soldiers.
How, then, were these military officers supposed to cultivate so-called “soft power”? The answer lies in NGOs, media outlets, and likely political parties. Think of the public associations, media platforms, and even politicians who defended Russia and received funding from it. According to reports, all of them fell under the control of Chernyshev, the high-ranking GRU officer. Information about senior Azerbaijani officials, military figures, and political leaders was funneled directly back to Moscow. The conclusion is unavoidable: a full network of influence agents operated inside Azerbaijan on behalf of Russia’s military intelligence.
A former employee of the now-dissolved Directorate told The Insider that Russia spent no less than 100 million dollars to establish “soft power” in Azerbaijan—money intended to weaken Turkey’s influence, strengthen Russia’s, and create leverage from within. And the result? Zero.
Why zero? Because the money was stolen. Russian curators, together with their Azerbaijani contacts in journalism and media, set up a corruption scheme and duped Putin himself. From Azerbaijan’s perspective, this might even be called “fortunate corruption”: the funds vanished into pockets rather than being effectively used against the country.
That same former insider described the situation bluntly: “Much of it was done simply for the sake of reports or in the spirit of ‘balalaika diplomacy.’ They drank, drank, and drank again.”
So this is Putin’s version of “soft power.” This is Russian intelligence. Even “cultural” ties were built with an axe. And some of our very own people—“the handle of the axe”—helped them.
Fortunately, they did not succeed. Yet the fact remains: Azerbaijani informants and influence agents were cooperating with Russian intelligence against their own country.
The pressing question now is whether Azerbaijan’s State Security Service, the Prosecutor’s Office, and other authorities will act on this information. Will the names of Russia’s Azerbaijani agents—the “soft power” profiteers—be made public?
Seyid Ahmadli, Bizimyol.info