As is known, the European Union’s new package of sanctions against Russia affects an additional 105 ships from the so-called “shadow fleet.” These vessels will be denied entry to EU ports and refused technical services. The purpose is to hinder the transport and sale of Russian oil, which is under sanctions.

It has emerged that among the sanctioned tankers are ships named “Shusha,” “Karabakh,” and “Nizami Ganjavi.” Previously, the vessel “Zangezur” had already been impacted by UK sanctions targeting Russia.

Bloggers critical of the Azerbaijani government have given wide coverage to this development in their posts, alleging that official Baku is helping Russia bypass sanctions. Some have even called on international organizations to punish Azerbaijan over this issue.

However, investigations show that the aforementioned ships belong to various private companies and are not state-owned by Azerbaijan. These tankers sail under the flags of different countries and primarily operate between Russia and Turkey. Just because the vessels are named “Shusha,” “Karabakh,” “Zangezur,” or “Nizami Ganjavi” does not mean they are wholly or partially Azerbaijani-owned.

For instance, according to the reputable shipping database Balticshipping, the vessel “Nizami Ganjavi” used to belong to Palmali Shipping Service. Palmali Holding clarified that this ship was previously named “Lankaran,” and it was later sold to another company, which renamed it “Nizami Ganjavi.”

Some Azerbaijani businessmen have commissioned ships in Japan, South Korea, and other countries, naming them after historical or geographic Azerbaijani regions or notable figures. These ships might carry Russian oil or oil from other nations. Palmali Holding also has ships named after Mahammad Amin Rasulzadeh and Polad Hashimov. However, this company is not Azerbaijani state-owned; it’s owned by businessman Mubariz Mansimov, who is simply of Azerbaijani origin.

So, holding the Azerbaijani state accountable for all this is highly questionable—and those making such accusations must provide solid reasoning.

The broader “shadow fleet” under EU scrutiny includes 444 vessels. Among them are ships owned by companies founded by businessmen from EU member states. If the EU is also responsible for those individuals and firms, then it might as well be sanctioning itself—which, according to some Azerbaijani political bloggers’ logic, would be the conclusion. This, of course, is absurd. Understanding the difference between a state and a private company shouldn’t be so difficult.

It’s also worth noting that Azerbaijan has not joined anti-Russia sanctions. Previously, there have been international sanctions on Iran, Georgia, and Turkey. Does this mean Azerbaijan should cut all economic and trade ties with every neighbor just because the U.S. or EU imposes sanctions? Sanctions have been imposed on China too. Should Azerbaijan stop talking to everyone? Should it greet no one?

To those political critics who accuse Azerbaijan of helping Russia bypass sanctions without thorough research, we ask: Why ignore the skyrocketing trade volume between Armenia and Russia? Why not question the EU itself, which recently approved €2.5 billion in aid to Armenia—a country openly helping Russia bypass the same EU sanctions?

Let’s set Armenia aside. According to the EU’s own official statistics, its member states remain key trade partners of Russia. For example, in 2024, trade between France and Russia rose by 9.4%, and between Slovenia and Russia, it doubled.

Slovenia might be small—but what about Germany, Europe’s largest economy? Germany is still Russia’s top EU trade partner. Though bilateral trade volume declined by 13%, there was still €684.5 million worth of trade. Hungary is second, with trade up 16% (reaching €551.5 million), and Italy is third, with trade volume at €436.9 million.

This data is from April 2025, based on official EU statistics.

Hungary is known to diverge from EU’s anti-Russian policy—but France and Germany are both major EU powers. While they sanction Russia over Ukraine, they continue trading with it.

So those calling on the EU to sanction Azerbaijan for allegedly helping Russia—what do they say about Germany and France? Should the EU sanction itself first?

Strangely enough, Italy, a major EU member, pursues a semi-independent policy on Russia—yet some Azerbaijani bloggers and politicians demand that Azerbaijan fully cut ties with Moscow. These maximalist approaches don’t seem to consider what kind of damage such drastic moves could inflict on Azerbaijan.

Yes, the opposition’s role is to challenge the government and seek power—that’s normal, even necessary. But demanding that Azerbaijan sever all ties with Russia just because of Ukraine is illogical. Did Ukraine cut ties with Armenia when Armenia occupied Azerbaijani territory for 30 years? No. Then why should Azerbaijan be forced to denounce its cooperation with Russia now?

Given Russia’s recent anti-Azerbaijan stance and behavior, yes, Azerbaijan has understandably distanced itself politically. But that doesn’t mean all ties must be cut. Politics requires rational thinking—not emotional outbursts. Petty squabbles and tantrums don’t work in international diplomacy. Politics has long since become a precise science.

Yes, both the Azerbaijani government and society are justifiably displeased with Russia’s recent behavior. But demanding a complete and immediate rupture over the Ukraine war reflects a lack of political competence.

As a final point: Azerbaijan has already begun exporting natural gas to Ukraine. That’s a historic first. In politics, real steps matter—not just loud words.

Bahaddin Hazi